



UKRAINIAN DIASPORA AND TEMPORARILY PROTECTED UKRAINIANS AFTER THE FULL-SCALE INVASION

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CONCLUSIONS

Migration of Ukrainians gradually increased from 1990 to 2021, with a peak in 2015-2020. In total, the increase was 2.2 times over the entire period, or about 1,412,532 people, according to the UN.

The main countries of migration to the EU were Poland, Germany, and Italy.

The vast majority of migrants are women.

In 2021, the number of residence permits increased by 38% compared to the previous year.

At the end of 2021, about 1,500,195 people received residence permits in the European Union.

From 1990 to 2020, the number of Ukrainian migrants to the European Union increased from 638,885 to 1,412,532. This indicates a steady and significant increase in migration flows and reflects the growing interest of Ukrainians in moving to the West. The most popular destination countries for Ukrainian migrants were Poland (19.32% of all Ukrainians who left in 2020), Germany (20.53%), and Italy (17.60%). Some countries, in particular Eastern European countries, proved to be attractive for Ukrainian migrants as they share borders and cultural ties with Ukraine. On the other hand, Western countries, such as Germany and Italy, attracted Ukrainian migrants with their developed economies and employment opportunities.

The sharp increase in migration during 2015-2020 is indicative: during the previous 10 years, migration grew quite gradually and amounted to a total of about 160 thousand people, but since 2015, the increase in migrants has been more than 330 thousand. The total increase of migrants compared to 1990 as of 2020 was approximately 2.2 times.

A gender breakdown shows that the vast majority of migrants are women. In 1990, 56% of women migrated abroad from the total number of migrants, and 59% in 2020. The peak figures of 61-62% were observed during 2010-2015. Men accounted for 44% in 1990 and 41% in 2020. It is noteworthy that the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent Russian aggression did not cause a massive outflow of men abroad - only 38% of men migrated in 2015.

Observations of the change in the number of residence permits show that the growth was particularly noticeable in 2016 and 2021, when the number of permits increased by 75% and 38%, respectively. The increased demand in these years could be related to the political instability in the country, as a significant percentage of permits were obtained between 2014-2016 and 2021, which correlates with the intensification of Russian aggression against Ukraine. While the total number of permits was 1,088,361 in 2020, in 2021 the number of permits exceeded 1,500,195.

Thus, at the end of 2021, about 1,500,195 residence permits were issued in the European Union. This figure includes all permits granted, such as visas for employment or study, as well as special permits provided for by national legislation.

In ten years, from 2012 to 2021, the number of long-term permits doubled from 262,778 to 553,444.

The three largest countries by number of permits include Italy, the Czech Republic, and Spain.

According to the European Statistical Office's data on the number of long-term residence permits for Ukrainians in the European Union, the number of permits increased from 262,778 to 553,444 in the ten years from 2012 to 2021. This shows the growing interest of Ukrainians in obtaining a long-term residence permit in the EU. The three largest countries in terms of the number of permits issued include Italy, the Czech Republic and Spain. The increase in many countries has been observed since 2014-2017. Compared to the number of permits issued in general, a third of Ukrainians in Italy received long-term permits, about 90 thousand out of 194 thousand residents in the Czech Republic have a residence permit for more than 5 years, almost all permits issued in Spain are long-term, and in Germany (73 thousand out of 79 thousand permits for 2021). In Poland, the number of long-term permits is small, only 81,034 compared to 65,1221 total residence permits.

The movement of Ukrainians to EU countries during the war was influenced by a combination of geopolitical, economic and personal factors. Employment opportunities, language similarities, cultural ties, and existing diaspora communities play a significant role in shaping Ukrainians' decisions to move to the EU. Challenges include tracking Ukrainians who have been granted temporary protection in several EU countries, returned to Ukraine, or were granted temporary protection as part of the EU diaspora before the full-scale invasion.

The largest payments for Ukrainians are in the countries of residence of the EU: Belgium €1100 per month

Most Ukrainian communities/centers: Germany and Poland (10+ active)

Most employed: Poland - 739 thousand Ukrainians

The largest number of persons under temporary EU protection: Poland with 1,708,740 persons

Peak months for temporary asylum in the EU: March, April, May 2023

The largest number of asylum seekers per month: (as of June-July 2023) 1. Poland and Germany - an average of 21 thousand people/month, 2. Czech Republic - 9 thousand/month 3. Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, Norway - 2 thousand/month.

As of 05/09/2023, according to Eurostat, 5,046,238 Ukrainians were granted temporary asylum status in the EU.

The largest number of temporary migrants as of 12.07.2023 was received by the following countries: Poland: 1,685,780 permits; Germany: 1,091,283 permits; Czech Republic: 499,695 permits. Almost all EU countries offer financial assistance to Ukrainian TDPs (with the exception of Greece). The largest financial assistance is provided by: Belgium €1100 per month; Denmark €853 per month; Ireland €824 per month.

In none of the countries was there a correlation between the escalation on the frontline/blackouts (in November-December 2022) and a higher number of temporary protection registrations. It can be assumed that a larger number of Ukrainians who left during the winter

planned to return quickly and did not apply for official registration in the host country.

In the vast majority of the EU countries analyzed, the dynamics of obtaining temporary protection certificates is similar: the peak in March-May 2022 (<60% of all displaced persons as of 12.07.2023). Only Ireland, Latvia, and Romania show uneven dynamics of migration - with fluctuations, without a characteristic gradual decline. Romania has a special dynamic: no characteristic peak in temporary protection registrations at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and a stable monthly number of displaced persons until March 2023.

As a percentage of the local population, the Czech Republic and Poland host the largest share of refugees in Central Europe - more than 4 percent of their population. More Ukrainians have applied for asylum in the Czech Republic (11 million inhabitants) than in France, Italy and Spain together (174 million inhabitants). Ireland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Austria received 1.2 million applications, equivalent to 1-2 percent of their populations. The three Baltic states received much smaller absolute numbers of refugees, although their share of the local population is still significant: 3.3 percent in Estonia, 2.7 percent in Lithuania, and 2.5 percent in Latvia.

More Ukrainians have applied for protection in Bulgaria (156,960 out of a population of 7 million) than in France (89,080, population 68 million).

The average employment rate for TDPs in the EU is 40%. The highest percentage of employed TDPs is observed in EU countries with a familiar cultural and linguistic environment and a short distance to the state border of Ukraine (Czech Republic, Poland).

In the most numerous Facebook communities in each of the EU countries, we identified posts of a household and informational nature, almost no publications on the war in Ukraine, post-war reconstruction, and no involvement of the diaspora in the political and public life of Ukraine.

Ukraine's image in Europe and in the European media

The results of the study show that the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, contributed to greater recognition by ordinary Europeans of Ukraine's status as an independent state and the formation of an attractive image of the Ukrainian nation. Before that, public opinion in Europe was dominated by the perception of Ukraine as part of Russia, and Ukrainians were identified with Russians. Pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine were deeply rooted in the minds of Europeans due to years of Russian propaganda. Therefore, the process of realizing a historical reality that differs from the Russian interpretation is quite difficult.

The overwhelming majority of European media and European politicians currently declare pro-Ukrainian views, and Ukraine is in the focus of news, which, with few exceptions, provides quite objective coverage of events in Ukraine.

However, Russian influence persists, despite the ban on broadcasting leading propaganda TV channels in Europe. Nowadays, Russian propaganda is active through pro-Russian bloggers, Telegram channels, satellite channels, numerous Russian cultural and public foundations, etc. The methods of propaganda have become more sophisticated, manipulating European tolerance, a tendency to compromise conflict resolution, and the value of stability and prosperity. Propaganda clichés such as «not everything is so clear», calls for «peace at any cost», «reconciliation between Ukrainians and Russians», demands to stop supplying

weapons to Ukraine, etc. continue to be used. And because of the traditionally somewhat romanticized image of Russia in Europe, the myth of «good Russians and bad Putin» still dominates the minds of average European citizens, according to respondents.

Pro-Russian actors are actively speculating on price increases, directly linking them to the war and stirring up anti-Ukrainian sentiment among Europeans. Study participants reported individual cases of aggressive attitudes toward Ukrainians by pro-Russian locals and Russians living in Europe. Therefore, strengthening the information front in Europe (primarily through a powerful and professional TV channel) remains an urgent task for Ukraine. Without the informational «de-occupation» of Europe from the influence of Russian propaganda, it is impossible for Europeans to adequately understand both Russian-Ukrainian relations and Ukraine itself.

As for the media needs of Ukrainians living in Europe, there is no shortage of information about the situation in Ukraine. Ukrainian emigrants maintain close ties with family and friends in Ukraine, actively use social media, and receive all the information they need. One only has to pay attention to the fact that some Ukrainians use pro-Russian Telegram channels that spread fake narratives about Ukraine. Therefore, debunking such channels and combating fake news on social media remains relevant.

Ukrainian diaspora centers in the EU: main activities and potential

The results of the study suggest that the Ukrainian diaspora can only be considered a community of Ukrainians who have long left Ukraine, permanently reside in another country, associate their future with it, have integrated into the local community, but do not lose their spiritual and cultural ties to Ukraine.

The Ukrainians who left for Europe in 2022-2023 because of the war are more likely to be temporary migrants to the EU, recipients of temporary protection (TDP - temporary displaced persons), rather than a «new diaspora.» The vast majority of them have not yet fully integrated in their host countries, do not associate themselves with these countries, and have not decided on their future plans for living in Europe. In the future, some of them will stay in Europe and join the Ukrainian diaspora, but for now they are mostly in a state of uncertainty, waiting for the war in Ukraine to end.

The Ukrainian diasporas in the three countries (Germany/Italy/France) are somewhat different due to the socio-economic, cultural and mental peculiarities of each country, different motivations for choosing a country to move to, different numbers and different levels of interaction between Ukrainians in these countries. The core of the diaspora in each country is made up of different social groups, which affects the activity and style of the diaspora.

Prior to the outbreak of the full-scale war in 2022, Ukrainian diaspora centers in Europe were mainly focused on small-scale cultural projects, humanitarian, informational, or legal support for Ukrainian migrants, and consolidation of Ukrainians in certain cities and villages. There have been spikes in activity in response to high-profile events in Ukraine (the Maidan and the 2014 war), but it was the full-scale invasion of 2022 that launched the diaspora's powerful engine.

After February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian diaspora became a key communicator between temporary migrants from Ukraine and official structures, migration authorities of European countries, and support groups for Ukrainians in Europe. In parallel with this work, large-scale humanitarian and informational assistance to Ukraine was provided, as well as work to shape the pro-Ukrainian position of the European community.

Another important aspect of the Ukrainian diaspora's activities was cultural and educational work, combating Russian myths, active promotion of Ukraine in Europe, and work to preserve the Ukrainian identity of those Ukrainians who are now citizens of other countries.

In the future, the Ukrainian diaspora is ready to take an active part in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and become a mediator for European businessmen interested in rebuilding Ukraine.

The results of the study show that the Ukrainian diaspora has enormous potential and a high capacity for self-organization and prompt, effective action. However, diaspora communities could fulfill their patriotic mission in Europe with even more enthusiasm and effectiveness through effective communication and close cooperation with international organizations and authorities in Ukraine.

Ukrainian diaspora centers in the EU: key issues and challenges

Since the activities of the centers are carried out on a voluntary basis and do not have stable financial support, they are mostly spontaneous and rely on the enthusiasm of their leaders. The main difficulties that diaspora communities often face are mainly caused by three factors:

1. financial problems (lack of premises and financial resources)
2. information difficulties (lack of support or weak support in the local media)
3. insufficient communication with the authorities (local and especially with the Ukrainian authorities)

Communication with embassies/consulates and relevant authorities in Ukraine is very important for the centers both in terms of material and logistical support and moral support, i.e. proper recognition of their contribution to Ukraine's victory.

Without Ukraine's support, many of the organizations may cease to operate after a while, as they require significant financial and human resources. Accordingly, Ukraine will lose an additional opportunity to preserve and build up a stronghold of pro-Ukrainian forces in Europe.

Representatives of the organizations had some ideas on how to improve the interaction between the organizations and the Ukrainian authorities, especially with embassies and consulates. The most urgent is the need to establish a Ukrainian cultural center in each country as a mediator between Ukrainians abroad and Ukraine, as a structure that can consolidate the activities of the centers and become a location for interaction between the centers. In addition, it is important to create a single online platform and chatbots for Ukrainians in Europe that would contain all the information related to the residence of Ukrainians in a particular country.

However, in order to develop a strategy and specific forms of interaction between the

diaspora and the Ukrainian authorities, a series of roundtables with the participation of heads of centers and representatives of embassies, etc. is needed. A channel for regular meetings and exchange of views/important information should be established.

Ukrainians under temporary protection:

Main problems and prospects for returning to Ukraine

Temporary asylum seekers in Europe have a large number of problems that are often difficult to solve without assistance. These problems are mostly related to lack of knowledge of the language, misunderstanding and unfamiliarity with the bureaucratic system of European countries, the medical care system, etc.

In the new country, displaced persons also face the lack of separate housing, problems with employment and enrollment of children in kindergartens and schools. The solution to these problems is complicated by the severe moral and psychological state of those who survived the occupation or were in the war zone.

These circumstances lead to civic passivity of the majority of TDPs, their unwillingness to integrate into the new society and lack of a clear vision of their future. These factors motivate some of the recipients of temporary protection to return to Ukraine.

However, the longer the war lasts, the more Ukrainians adapt to the new country, find jobs, housing and begin to rebuild their lives in a new place. The study confirms the hypotheses of many experts that the longer the war lasts, the fewer Ukrainians will return home.

As long as the war continues, it is impossible to predict the exact percentage of those who will stay in the EU. Because a significant number of displaced persons have postponed making a decision about their future life until the war ends. To return home, there must be a guarantee that two basic needs will be met: security, housing & employment.

A powerful motive for returning home could be the existence of real prospects for Ukraine as an independent, secure and prosperous state.

Today, the most urgent task is to prepare and start implementing a State Program to create conditions for the return of temporary displaced persons home. Such a program will be a testament to this Ukrainian community that Ukraine as a state has prospects and that Ukraine has prospects for their lives.

The results of the study confirm the fact that after the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine lost a significant part of its valuable human resource through mass migration, which could have negative consequences for the economy and demographic situation in the country.

The vast majority of those who took part in the survey are women (92.5%), the most productive age is 36-45 years old (42.0%). They are mostly specialists with higher or incomplete higher education (79.4%), and the most common educational profile among displaced persons is social sciences (36.8%).

The vast majority of respondents (77.3%) moved to Europe in February-May last year. The lion's share (96.4%) of temporary migrants have received or plan to receive temporary protection status.

One third of respondents (34.5%) moved only with their children, without other family members (without spouses and parents). The whole family moved with 12.4% of respondents.

Most temporary displaced persons suffered great losses due to the war, so they needed time to restore their mental and physical health. More than half of them lost their jobs (66.2%) and experienced the death of relatives/friends/acquaintances in the war (51.8%). 22.9% lost or damaged their homes, 22.7% of respondents lost their businesses, and 16.0% were under Russian occupation.

The results of the survey show that temporary migrants mostly do not regret moving to the EU, and almost a third of them currently plan to stay in Western Europe. Respondents in Germany are the most satisfied with their choice, while those who moved to Italy are significantly less satisfied.

According to the survey, the life of the majority (39.7%) of temporary migrants in the EU is worse than life in Ukraine until February 22, 2022. This may be one of the main motivations for returning home. Temporary displaced persons face many problems that they did not have at home. Most of these problems are related to the lack of knowledge of the language and the system of government functioning that is different from the Ukrainian one. The second place is taken by problems with meeting basic needs (housing, work, healthcare, living expenses, etc.).

On the other hand, the majority of temporary migrants are quite satisfied with the living conditions, support from the government agencies of the host countries and opportunities for integration into society provided by the EU countries. This motivates them to stay in the EU for permanent residence.

Bureaucracy (47.4%) and the inability to communicate properly due to lack of knowledge of the language (54.6%) are the top 2 problems faced by temporary migrants in Europe. They were most relevant in the first month of residence and remain relevant to this day.

However, in general, the majority of temporary displaced persons are quite satisfied with the attitude of the local population towards Ukrainians (74.5% satisfied), living conditions (70.7%), level of social support (69.8%), opportunities for language learning (63.9%), support from local authorities (55.6%), and opportunities for enrolling children in school (50.2%). Respondents in Italy are less satisfied with these and some other aspects, while those in Germany are more satisfied. In France, the figures are close to the data for the population as a whole, with only slightly less satisfaction with language learning opportunities.

A significant number of temporary migrants have already found employment, which significantly reduces the burden on the social assistance system in the EU countries and increases revenues to the state budgets of these countries. It can be assumed that after completing language courses, Ukrainians will be even more active in the EU labor market and the chances of their return to Ukraine will decrease. On the other hand, most jobs do not correspond to the specialty and level of qualification of temporary migrants, which may encourage them to return to their previous place of work in Ukraine (if any).

The majority of Ukrainians are gradually integrating into the local community and a significant number link their future or the future of their children to the host country. This will be a serious barrier to their return home.

Almost half (49.0%) of temporary displaced persons are unemployed and registered with the

Employment Center. The key reasons for not working are lack of knowledge of the language (61.4%) and attending intensive language courses (52.0%).

However, the percentage of employed people is quite high - 30.7% in the whole population. In Italy, it is even higher - 49.0%. Germany has the lowest share of employed people (19.0%), but it also has the highest percentage of respondents attending free language courses (66.5%).

The results of the study indicate a difficult psychological state of the vast majority of temporary asylum seekers, which complicates both their integration in a new country and their decision to return home. However, in general, staying in a safe country helps to gradually improve their emotional state, and assistance to Ukraine and maintaining close contacts with relatives and friends in Ukraine keep temporary migrants likely to return home.

The number of Ukrainians abroad gradually increased from 1990 to 2020, however, security challenges and the unstable economic situation in Ukraine led to peak resettlement of Ukrainians during 2014-2016 and after the full-scale invasion. Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic became the main countries of resettlement for Ukrainians after Russia's aggression. Currently, more than 5 million Ukrainians have been granted temporary protection in the EU, which allows them to stay and work in the EU.

The majority of Ukrainians under temporary protection have not yet formed a «new» diaspora and are not fully integrated into the society of their host countries. This is due to lower living standards compared to Ukraine, lack of knowledge of the language, bureaucratic processes, and the new system of functioning of institutions in the EU. That is why attracting and returning Ukrainians after the war is an important priority for the state. Currently, Ukrainians are highly involved in advocacy, volunteering and cultural activities to support Ukraine, but over time, integration in host countries is increasing and requires more active involvement from the Ukrainian authorities to preserve the potential of Ukrainians abroad.

In the absence of a comprehensive dialogue and appropriate planning, both the diaspora and the TDPs may lose interest in actively supporting Ukraine in their host countries.

That is why it is recommended to hold strategic discussions with representatives of the relevant state authorities, with the involvement of experts and representatives of the diaspora to discuss and develop further steps to effectively engage the TDPs and the diaspora in Ukrainian issues. Timely dialogue will not only strengthen the advocacy of Ukrainian interests in many countries, using the experience, contacts and potential of Ukrainians on the ground, but will also improve the possibility of returning a significant number of Ukrainians home and creating the necessary conditions for maintaining their ties with Ukraine.

This study has conducted a preliminary review and monitoring of the main challenges and opportunities for engaging Ukrainians abroad, but a broader state research with the use of appropriate tools is needed to expand knowledge and formulate an effective state strategy for cooperation.

This situation is also typical for countries outside the European Union.

The information received from country participants allows us to identify certain trends in diaspora situations related to the socio-political, regulatory, cultural and administrative spheres of life in their countries of residence.

Adaptation of Ukrainians in the host country

Ukrainians demonstrate different adaptation strategies depending on the country of residence. Thus, we can identify the following types of adaptation strategies of Ukrainians: assimilation (in this case, there is a desire to completely dissolve into the population of the host country. The consequences of this may be the rejection of everything that in any way distinguishes them from the population of the host country. This can be observed among those who live in the United States and the State of Israel); cultural adaptation to the new environment (in this case, Ukrainians do not give up any manifestations of cultural belonging to Ukraine. And others do not expect them to do so. It is only a matter of certain changes in value orientations and norms that do not require a change of identity. These trends are typical for the Kingdom of Belgium; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the Swiss Confederation; Canada); structural adaptation to the new environment (inclusion in the life of the host country according to objective socio-economic indicators. Cultural indicators, in this case, fade into the background. The only significant parameter of culture is proficiency in the language of both the host country and Ukrainian. Similar trends are characteristic of Ukrainians in the Argentine Republic; the Kingdom of Thailand; and the State of Japan.)

Ukrainian migrants are mostly perceived in the host countries as managed subjects, and their adaptation/integration is the result of the efforts of institutions specially engaged in this area in the host countries. This administrative aspect is related to the policy of host countries towards migrants from Ukraine (especially after the beginning of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine). We mean that this process is regulated, consistent, and conscious on the part of 7 out of 9 host countries (except for the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Thailand), and as a result, Ukrainians gradually fit into the life of the host society, adapting to it. This is especially true in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Swiss Confederation, and Canada. This is due to the fact that these countries assume the obligation to treat migrants from Ukraine as equals.

For Ukrainians in the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Thailand, adaptation is more characterized by a spontaneous course. We mean that adaptation processes in these countries can take place under the influence of subjective efforts of both migrants and the local population.

It is also possible to note the absence of a rigid boundary between the host population and migrants in the host countries, as there are categories of Ukrainian migrants who are no longer perceived as «strangers» by the locals, because they are socially integrated due to their knowledge of the host country's language, active social interaction and have certain socio-economic indicators that are perceived by the local population as an advantage - education, qualifications, material well-being, etc. (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Kingdom of Belgium, Canada,

There is a certain social distance both between Ukrainians of different migration waves and the mainstream population (Canada, the United States, the Swiss Confederation, the State of Israel, the Republic of Argentina, and the State of Japan). This may be due to: first, the results of unsuccessful integration into the country of residence. Failure in employment, career, social recognition, etc., and as a result, compensation for this failure by emphasizing their own cultural characteristics; secondly, some migrants from Ukraine may not set themselves such a task as adaptation/integration into the life of the host country. Such a strategy is typical, for example, for those who planned to spend a certain amount of time in the country of immigration and then return to Ukraine (e.g., to earn enough money for their own business,

housing, etc.; to wait out the active phase of military operations in Ukraine), but got «stuck».

The level of adaptation of Ukrainians in the countries of their residence, the level of their civic and political activity in helping Ukraine and Ukrainians also depends on the massiveness of active pro-Ukrainian movements in these countries, the institutionalization of these movements, and the traditions of cooperation and activity of Ukrainian diasporas. Participants of the consultative focus groups and individual interviews confirmed the importance of being in Ukrainian communities for feeling support and a sense of shared context of the events they have experienced. In settlements where Ukrainian communities are small or inactive, participants of the consultative focus groups and individual interviews also had an inactive social and political life. Long-standing traditions of preserving Ukrainian identity and culture, and generally continued civic and political activity, have contributed to the institutionalization of communities, which further engages newly arrived Ukrainians.

The states of development in which diasporas are located share common features, such as work to preserve self-identity, language and culture, activation in times of mortal danger to the nation and the state, the desire to unite for the sake of Ukraine and Ukrainians, and the networking of various initiatives. The common desire to unite was evident during almost every consultative focus group, when participants exchanged contacts on their own initiative for joint meetings and dialogues. Intergenerational conflicts of different «waves of emigration» are also similar in diasporas of different countries.

Differences can be seen in the varying levels of influence diasporas have on the governments and societies of these countries. This is partly due to the different socio-political conditions of the host environment. Different economic conditions of the countries and peculiarities of their internal policies towards immigrants change the proportion between free time for social and political activity and time for earning money for survival. Peculiarities of foreign policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Ukraine's allied states, peculiarities of internal democratic procedures and traditions in the context of the needs for changes in domestic and foreign policy, political activity of Russian diasporas, Russian state diplomacy and agents - all this also affects the effectiveness of the work of Ukrainian diasporas.

The purely internal problems of less effective pro-Ukrainian movements include the lack of experience of «neophytes» who organize social and political movements, the difficulty of older generations of the diaspora to keep up with the times, and psychological problems caused by the war. Diasporans from different countries may also have different levels of knowledge about building organizational and inter-organizational structures.

Sources of information about Ukraine and the host country

Ukrainians in all host countries follow events in Ukraine. The dominant main sources of information are: relatives and friends in Ukraine; YouTube pages of Ukrainian TV channels (in particular, the Television News Service program of 1+1 TV channel, the United News marathon, Toronto TV, Suspilne, etc.); Ukrainian online media (Ukrayinska Pravda, Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, NV); official pages of Ukrainian authorities, including the pages of the President of Ukraine, the official pages of the President of the European Parliament, journalists Vitaliy Portnikov and Serhiy Sternenko, and posts on the Ukrainian segment of Facebook, Twitter and Telegram.

Ukrainians also try to follow events in the host country. The main sources are official national television channels (BBC, A24, CNN, Fox News, Bloomberg, Ynet and N12, 12, 13, Channel 9, NHK), local channels (Edinburgh Live, Scots Magazine, LA Times, NPR, New York Times, Bangkok

Post, Tiger, Kyoto Shimbun), local media, social networks (Reddit (Canada); lanacion.com.ar (Argentine Republic), vesty.co.il (State of Israel), and local residents who are part of the social circle of Ukrainian migrants.

With regard to the sources of information used by Ukrainian diaspora, on the one hand, it is a good sign that the majority of participants in the consultative focus groups and individual surveys named official sources of information from the Ukrainian state. On the other hand, the frequent references to trust in Telegram are alarming, as there are known cases of Russian special services accessing communications on this social network. Telegram is also known, perhaps more than other social networks, as a channel for pro-Russian propaganda and conspiracy content in general. In particular, the above-mentioned lists of Telegram channels may include those that masquerade as pro-Ukrainian, but actually promote certain pro-Russian narratives. Whether diatribes distinguish one from the other is an open question. The mention of the Viber app for personal communication is also alarming. It is worth recalling that some cyber experts also claim that the Russian authorities have access to the correspondence and data of users of this messenger.

It is worth noting that a number of participants in the consultative focus groups and individual interviews named explicit Russian pro-Putin propaganda information resources as sources of information. However, the participants also noted that they realize that this is enemy propaganda. No less alarming is the fact that Ukrainian diaspora groups also use the information resources of the Russian opposition as sources of information. In this context, it is worth mentioning that some participants in the consultative focus groups and individual surveys reported cooperation with Russian diasporas opposed to the policies of Vladimir Putin and the Russian state. It is no secret that the Russian opposition has a range of opinions on what the future holds for Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, they broadcast relevant narratives, some of which can be harmful. We are talking, in particular, about the desire of some oppositionists to freeze the front line, which coincides with the corresponding narrative of Russian state propaganda. Or the unwillingness of some Russian oppositionists to pay reparations to Ukraine. Or about the frankly unrealistic scenarios of Russia's transformation into a democratic state within its current borders and with its current resources.

The conflicts between Ukrainian diasporas and the pro-war part of Russian diasporas, which were mentioned during focus groups and individual interviews, deserve special attention. These include violent attacks on Ukrainians, competition for influence on the governments and societies of their countries of residence, a long tradition of Russian dominance in the cultural and academic spheres of life in some countries, and Russian narratives that are harmful to Ukrainians. Russian influence in the countries identified by the Ukrainians Abroad project requires additional research.

Mutual assistance and self-organization of Ukrainians in the host country

The processes of self-organization and mutual assistance of Ukrainians in the host country directly depend on the peculiarities of the political culture and institutional structure of specific countries. We mean the following. Does the state consider migrants as individuals or as members of certain social communities? In the first case, the interaction between the institutions of the host country and migrants is based on the «state/individual» model. In the second case, an intermediary is recognized between the state and migrants in the form of various organizations (e.g., religious, ethnic, etc.). Based on this, Ukrainian diaspora organizations play a more prominent role in the socio-political space of the United States, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Argentina, and the State of Israel than in the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Belgium, and the Swiss Confederation. In the Kingdom of Thailand, the Ukrainian diaspora does not have any registered NGOs at all, which may be due to the small number of Ukrainians in the country compared to other countries, as well as the legal conditions for registering organizations. According to one Ukrainian woman, registering a legal entity of any format in Thailand is expensive.

Regardless of the host country, Ukrainians' mutual assistance and self-organization are accumulated in more or less four areas: labor market and labor relations (assistance in securing employment and income); administrative and legal (explanation of laws and legal norms of the host country, representation of interests, counseling, support); social protection (assistance in primary and secondary education, health insurance, banking, financial assistance, etc.

Interaction with the Ukrainian Embassy in the host country

Regardless of the country of residence, Ukrainian migrants are aware of the existence and activities of the Ukrainian embassy and use its services. In general, the activities of diplomatic missions are positively assessed. The work of the staff is positively assessed. Knowing the names and positions of responsible persons indicates that Ukrainian missions are open and accessible to migrants.

There are critical remarks about queues and the resulting complexity of some procedures due to the increase in the number of migrants and the functional load on the existing staff of Ukrainian embassies (London, Edinburgh, the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States, the Consulate of Ukraine in Belgium, the Embassy of Ukraine in Switzerland). The claim that the position of Charge d'Affaires of Ukraine in Thailand, instead of Ambassador, negatively affects the level of political influence of Ukraine (unlike Russia) requires additional professional validation.

Some embassies were criticized both for inadequate cooperation with diasporas and, in general, for an inadequate level of diplomacy, according to some participants of the consultative focus groups.

The most acute criticism was directed at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which, according to one of the participants of the consultative focus group, refused to help a Ukrainian refugee who had been raped by a Russian soldier.

Pro-Russian influence in the host country

There are clear reactions of Ukrainians to the pro-Russian influence in all host countries, which is caused by Russia's open military aggression against Ukraine. It should also be noted that these reactions are manifested against the backdrop of a fixed conditional generalized perception (both by Ukrainian migrants themselves, especially the early waves, and by the local population) of migrants from the post-Soviet space as «Russians» (the Kingdom of Thailand, the State of Israel, the United States). Or the existence of close economic and cultural relations with the Russian Federation, which have been built over the years (Argentine Republic, United Kingdom, Swiss Confederation, State of Israel). This can be traced to the level of rethinking values and cultural attitudes, and is reflected in the desire of Ukrainians to resist pro-Russian influence, which is expressed in social consolidation. The manifestations of which can be considered: cohesion, organization of public events and involvement of representatives of the local population, opposition Russians, open demonstration of their

own self-identification as belonging to Ukraine.

Pro-Russian influence in host countries can manifest itself in the following ways: tensions and conflicts on cultural and domestic grounds (Canada); aggressive/provocative behavior of Russian migrants (Canada, the Kingdom of Belgium); information policy of the aggressor country in the host country (Canada, the Argentine Republic, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Swiss Confederation, the Kingdom of Thailand, the State of Japan); spreading pro-Russian narratives through the academic and educational environment (the United Kingdom, the Argentine Republic, the United States).

Restoration of Ukraine and repatriation of Ukrainians

Regardless of the country of residence, the vast majority of the representatives of the consultation focus groups (61 out of 81) have not heard of the government's Action Plan for the Reconstruction of Ukraine from the War. And those who are aware of it expressed critical remarks about its unrealistic nature (because, according to the informants, reasonable proposals from the public and business representatives were mostly not included in it). However, Ukrainian migrants are ready to join the public discussion of this Plan with the participation of Ukrainians abroad; and are ready to contribute to the restoration of Ukraine remotely or indirectly (by sending their own money, collecting humanitarian aid, etc.).

The repatriation process will be complicated by certain risks associated with socio-cultural changes in Ukraine, which may provoke the feeling of «migrants in Ukraine» among repatriates.

There is a tendency of reluctance to return to Ukraine in the near future, which a certain part of Ukrainian migrants (regardless of the country of residence) justifies by reasons that are purely declarative and utilitarian (the meaning of which can be modeled as follows - «first, the state of Ukraine must fulfill certain conditions to make me want to return»): Ukraine must win the war and return the occupied territories; the danger to life caused by Russian military aggression must be over in Ukraine; Ukrainians in Ukraine must feel their own financial stability; there must be prospects for career and self-development of Ukrainians in Ukraine; corruption in the state must be fought; there must be equality of all citizens in the face of the law; post-war problems related to arms trafficking and post-traumatic stress disorder must be resolved, etc. reforms in education, economy, social sphere, continuation of decentralization reform, reform of the law enforcement sector, judiciary and prosecution, tax reform, transport reform, development of public monitoring of public procurement, protection and restoration of the environment, etc.

The dynamics of the return of Ukrainian migrants is directly related to the migration policy of host countries in terms of material support for Ukrainians (social assistance, work permits, employment assistance, housing, granting the right to permanent residence, etc.), which is a typical trend in Canada, the Swiss Confederation, and the State of Israel.



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